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THE MONGOLS IN IRAN 
 george e. lane 
 Iran was dramatically brought into the Mongol sphere of inﬂ uence toward the end 
of the second decade of the thirteenth century. As well as the initial traumatic mili-
tary incursions, Iran also experienced the start of prolonged martial rule, followed 
later by the domination and rule of the Mongol Ilkhans. However, what began as a 
brutal and vindictive invasion and occupation developed into a benign and cultur-
ally and economically ﬂ ourishing period of unity and strength. The Mongol period 
in Iranian history provokes controversy and debate to this day. From the horrors of 
the initial bloody irruptions, when the ﬁ rst Mongol-led armies rampaged across 
northern Iran, to the glory days of the Ilkhanate-Yuan axis, when the Mongol-
dominated Persian and Chinese courts dazzled the world, the Mongol inﬂ uence on 
Iran of this turbulent period was profound. 
 The Mongols not only affected Iran and southwestern Asia but they also had a 
devastating effect on eastern Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. In many parts of 
the world, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas in particular, the Mongols’ 
name has since become synonymous with murder, massacre, and marauding may-
hem. They became known as Tatars or Tartars in Europe and Western Asia for two 
reasons. Firstly, until Genghis Khan destroyed their dominance, the Tatars were the 
largest and most powerful of the Turco-Mongol tribes. And secondly, in Latin 
 Tartarus meant hell and these tribes were believed to have issued from the depths of 
Hades. 
 Their advent has been portrayed as a bloody “bolt from the blue” that left a trail 
of destruction, death, and horriﬁ ed grief in its wake. Contemporary accounts paint 
a consistent picture of the shock and awe experienced by so many on their ﬁ rst 
encounter with this “storm from the east.” The Armenian cleric and historian 
Kirakos (d. 1272) describes the Tatars’ arrival thus:
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 It seems to me that even if many other [authors] narrate the same events, they 
will nonetheless all be found lacking, for the evils which afﬂ icted all lands are 
more than can be related. For this is the end of time; and precursors have spoken 
about the antichrist and the arrival of the sons of destruction . . . . [O]ur patriarch, 
saint Nerses prophetically spoke about the destruction of Armenia by the Nation 
of the Archers, destruction and ruin encompassing all lands, which we have 
witnessed with our own eyes . . . . A few years after the destruction of [Ganja], this 
fanatical and wily army divided up by lot all the lands of Armenia, Georgia, and 
[Azerbaijan], each chief according to his importance receiving cities, districts, 
lands, and fortresses in order to take, demolish, and ruin them. Each [chief] went 
to his allotted area with his wives, sons, and military equipment where they 
remained without a care polluting and eating all the vegetation with their camels 
and livestock. (Kirakos) 
 A medieval Russian chronicle from Novgorod vividly describes their impact on the 
region:
 No one exactly knows who they are, nor whence they came out, nor what their 
language is, nor of what race they are, nor what their faith is . . . God alone knows. 1   
 A thirteenth-century Persian eyewitness succinctly summarized their initial impact 
in Iran: “They came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they 
departed.” 2  The Arab chronicler Ibn al-Athir, though not an eyewitness, described 
his emotions on hearing of the Mongols’ advent in words that have echoed down 
through history and colored half the world’s future generations’ perception of the 
Eurasian hordes.
 O would that my mother had never borne me, that I had died before and that I 
were forgotten [so] tremendous disaster such as had never happened before, 
and which struck all the world, though the Muslims above all . . .  Dadjdjal 
[Muslim Anti-Christ] will at least spare those who adhere to him, and will only 
destroy his adversaries. These [Mongols], however, spared none. They killed 
women, men, children, ripped open the bodies of the pregnant and slaughtered 
the unborn. 3  
 This negative and awesome impression created by the Mongol invasion was wel-
comed and probably deliberately created by the invaders. Chinggis Khan (1167–
1227) even described himself as “the Punishment of God” and was happy that 
others saw him in this role. The Mongol period is noted not only for its supposed 
barbarity but also for the plethora of historians and chroniclers it produced, many 
of them writing in Persian. These many scribes, both within the Mongol camp 
and outside it, were happy to pander to the Mongols’ desire for notoriety and a 
reputation for barbarism and cruelty. However, since the renowned Princeton 
historian Bernard Lewis questioned the basis of the poisoned reputation of the 
Mongols in 1995, scholarly opinion has grown more sympathetic toward the leg-
acy of Chinggis Khan. 
 By 1206, the Turco-Mongol clans of the steppe were united under the charis-
matic rule of Chinggis Khan. It was the size and unity of this force and its endur-
ance that distinguished it from previous steppe armies. Prior to Chinggis Khan, 
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the tribes had often been manipulated by the Chinese and other settled peoples, 
and often the nomads’ predatory raids had been at the behest of a hidden hand. 
In contrast, Chinggis Khan raided for the prestige he accrued on which to build 
his power, and for the booty with which to placate his rivals, satisfy his followers, 
and outwit any reckless challenge to his rule. The initial raids into northern China 
and then westward into Iran and Russia over the ﬁ rst decades of the thirteenth 
century were characterized by the barbarity and cruelty with which the name of 
Chinggis Khan and the Mongols have become inextricably identiﬁ ed. However, 
Mongol rule subsequent to this, during the reigns of Chinggis Khan’s grandsons, 
Hülegü in Iran (r. 1256–65) and Qubilai in China (r. 1260–94), stands in sharp 
contrast to this earlier violent irruption. The “Storm from the East” arose from 
anger, a spirit of vengeance, and a need for the assertion of power. 
 Chinggis Khan, the leader of the “people of the felt-walled tents” and the “the 
peoples of the Nine Tongues,” 4  had been born Temüjin and had endured a brutal 
and brutalizing childhood. His father was murdered when he was still young, and 
subsequently his mother and siblings were abandoned by their clan to survive in a 
very harsh and unforgiving environment. Compassion was not a valued virtue on 
the steppe. This was a society of submit or be challenged, ﬁ ght or be beaten, and 
often kill or be killed. 
 Force of personality, military and physical might, and tribal alliances were the 
means through which tribal leaders of the steppe clans rose to power. They main-
tained power only by delivering on promises of wealth and plenty. If the promise 
did not materialize, the leader fell, or was forced to join an alliance with another 
leader who could meet the aspirations of the tribe. Steppe life was brutal, and know-
ing nothing else it was this ethos that the steppe tribes initially exported. 
 The Mongols themselves were few in number, but from the outset Chinggis 
absorbed other Turkic tribes, and later any conquered troops, into his armies. He 
used traditional steppe military tactics, with light cavalry, feigned retreats, and skill-
ful archery, to conduct what were initially raids of pillage and plunder from bases in 
the steppe into the “sown.” Terror, real and imagined, was an important element in 
the success of these raids. In 1211, the Mongols invaded the independent Jin of 
northern China, helped by renegade seminomadic Khitans, in a struggle that con-
tinued until 1234, after Chinggis’s death. It was the defeat of the Jin capital, Zhongdu, 
the site of modern Beijing, that gave rise to one of the most notorious stories of 
Mongol atrocities.
 [a envoy from the Khwarazmshah] saw a white hill and in answer to his query 
was told by the guide that it consisted of bones of the massacred inhabitants. At 
another place the earth was, for a long stretch of the road, greasy from human fat 
and the air was so polluted that several members of the mission became ill and 
some died. This was the place, they were told, where on the day that the city was 
stormed 60,000 virgins threw themselves to death from the fortiﬁ cations in order 
to escape capture by the Mongols. 5  
 Chinggis Khan then turned his attention westward in campaigns against the 
Khwarazmshah and the Qara Khitai, a seminomadic tribe originally from 
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 northwestern China. The Qara Khitai were related to the Khitans of northern China, 
who had already helped the Mongols defeat the Jin or Jurchen, whom they viewed 
as oppressors and usurpers of the Khitans’ ancestral lands. 
 It should be remembered that the ﬁ rst Turco-Mongol invasion, the “forgotten” 
Turco-Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, was generally accepted and 
sometimes even welcomed by the Islamic world, and that the Qara Khitai had no 
problem recruiting Muslim Uyghurs to their inﬁ del administration. Qadi Imam 
Ibn Mahmud Uzjandi, a Persian notable, “saw the rectitude of seeking connections 
with the Khitai”, 7  while Arudi Samarqandi observed that “[the Ghurkhan’s] justice 
had no bounds, nor was there any limit to the effectiveness of his commands, and 
indeed, in these two things lies the essence of kingship.” 6  The Qara Khitai leader-
ship, though inﬁ del, had always been sympathetic and supportive to their Muslim 
subjects, and hence they had always received the support and approval of the caliph 
and the rest of the Islamic world. 8  However after the Qara Khitai leadership had 
welcomed into their court Küchlüg, the Naiman fugitive from the newly victorious 
armies of Chinggis Khan, their demise was inevitable. Küchlüg very quickly insin-
uated himself into the Qara Khitai royal family, exploiting their goodwill and his 
noble connections, and once a marriage had been established he conspired with 
the Qara Khitai’s neighbor, the Khwarazmshah, and seized the throne. Once in 
control, Küchlüg reversed the tolerant religious policies of his predecessors and 
instigated a reign of terror and oppression against his Muslim subjects, apparently 
unopposed by the Khwarazmshah, who considered himself a rival if not enemy of 
the caliph of Baghdad. 
 Well aware of this emerging situation in eastern Turkistan, the lands of the 
Uyghurs, Chinggis Khan dispatched his top general, the  noyan Jebe, with a small 
force to hunt down the fugitive Küchlüg. The Muslims of the former lands of the 
Qara Khitai welcomed Noyan Jebe and his Mongol troops as liberators and it was 
not long before their hated oppressor, Küchlüg, was captured and subjected to a 
ﬁ tting end. He was dragged to the square in front of Kashgar’s Friday mosque and, 
in a reenactment of his own execution of the city’s imam, he was publicly cruciﬁ ed 
to the gates of the Jama mosque. The Mongols were welcomed not only by the 
Muslims of the province but by the Turco-Mongol Khitans, who as descendants of 
the Liao, the original exiles from northern China, saw the Mongols as their potential 
saviors and as liberators of their ancestral lands. 
 In 1125, the Liao dynasty, which had ruled northern China since 907, was over-
thrown by the Jurchens or Jin, along with the Chinese Song dynasty. The Song royal 
family ﬂ ed south and established their capital in Hangzhou, whereas the Khitans, 
led by Prince Yelü Dashi, ﬂ ed westward, eventually settling in eastern Turkistan, 
where after the decisive victory at the battle of Qatwan in 1141 against the Great 
Saljuq, Sanjar, they were accepted as part of the Dar al-Islam. 
 This initial victory of the Mongols over Küchlüg was greatly welcomed by both 
the Muslims and the Khitans, who saw the opportunities now opening for them. 
For the Khitans there was the opportunity to return in triumph to their ancestral 
lands, and for the Muslim Uyghurs there was the opportunity for positions in the 
AQ1
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administration of the growing “empire” and as merchants and representatives on 
the trade routes between east and west. What should be stressed is that the Mongols’ 
ﬁ rst contact with the Islamic world was welcome and positive, and that those who 
took advantage of the opportunities on offer, such as Mahmud Yalavach and his 
sons Mas‘ud Beg and Ali Beg, were rewarded in the following years with power, 
inﬂ uence, and prestige. 
 It was with reluctance and initial trepidation that the Mongols rode out against 
Khwarazm (present-day Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), the ﬁ rst Muslim state to 
experience the full fury of the Mongol onslaught. The Khwarazmshah Ala al-Din 
Mohammad (r. 1200–20) nominally ruled over an empire that encompassed mod-
ern-day Iran, Afghanistan, and much of Transoxiana. However, deep divisions rent 
his predominantly Muslim lands, and besides bitter external enemies, such as the 
caliph in Baghdad, the Khwarazmshah was surrounded by enemies within. Even his 
court was a dangerous pit of violent intrigue between his Persian supporters from 
the urban areas and the south and followers of his mother, often representing the 
Qipchaq Turks and other nomadic and pagan elements, from the north. It was 
marauding, bloodthirsty bands of these Qipchaq and other Turkic elements that 
had long instilled fear and loathing in the Persian and Arab lands to the south. 
Often the confrontation occurred in the south in the lands of Iraq between the 
caliph’s armies and the Khwarazmshah’s Qipchaq hordes, and it was widely believed 
that it was the caliph himself who “roused the Tatars’ ambition for the lands of 
Islam” 9  by requesting the Great Khan’s help in ridding him of his troublesome 
neighbor. 
 The invasion by the Mongol forces of the Khwarazmshah’s Turco-Persian 
empire was in retaliation for the murder of a commercial and political trade dele-
gation composed of Mongols, Chinese, and Uyghur Muslims. Chinggis Khan had 
hoped for an alliance between his forces and those of his seemingly powerful 
neighbor: “I am the sovereign of the Sun-rise, and thou the sovereign of the Sun-
set.” 10  But the suicidal arrogance of the sultan’s riposte to these peaceful overtures 
left only one possible Mongol response. As the self- proclaimed “Punishment of 
God,” Chinggis Khan unleashed the bloody invasion and merciless devastation on 
the Islamic west that have made his name synonymous with barbaric mass 
slaughter. 
 The trail of blood and massacres that followed the crumbling of the 
Khwarazmshah’s empire in 1220 led from Central Asia through Iran to the Caucasus 
and north into the plains of Russia. Bukhara and Samarqand, capitals of Persian 
culture, were emptied and their walls and buildings razed. The citizens were 
slaughtered, scattered, sold into slavery, or transported to other parts of the empire 
where their skills as artisans or artists were valued. The chronicles have told us that 
1.6 or possibly even 2.4 million were put to the sword in Herat, while in Nishapur, 
the city of Omar Khayyam, 1.747 million were slaughtered. Though these ﬁ gures 
cannot be taken literally, they indicate that the scale of the slaughter was unprec-
edented. The two Mongol  noyan s (generals) Jebe and Sübedei led an expedition 
in pursuit of the ﬂ eeing Khwarazmshah, demanding that the citizens of the 
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 cities and towns in their path choose either submission, with possible employment 
as human shields for the advancing Mongol armies, or death, destruction, and slav-
ery. Outside every town they came upon, the Mongols would deliver a chilling mes-
sage: “Submit! And if ye do otherwise, what know we? God knoweth.” In fact there 
were few who did not fully know the implications of that ominous “otherwise.” 
 This epic cavalry mission of  noyan s Jebe and Sübedei is perhaps the greatest 
military reconnaissance trip of all time. It included not only intelligence gathering 
but conquest, massacres, and widespread pillaging in all the lands neighboring the 
Caspian Sea and beyond. In Iran and the Caucasus, the terror unleashed by those 
two generals ensured fear-ﬁ lled obedience for decades to come. Jebe and Sübedei’s 
expedition of pursuit, terror, and reconnaissance represents the Mongols at their 
destructive peak, and thereafter their armies became, for those who fell under the 
shadow of their approach, both the invincible wrath of God and the emissaries of 
the biblical Gog and Magog. 11  The Mongols wore their notoriety like a  khil‘at , a 
traditional brocade robe of honor. 
 Khorasan in particular suffered grievously for the sins of the Khwarazmshah. 
The numbers of those massacred and the extent of the destruction might well have 
been exaggerated, but the trauma was very real and the devastation widespread. 
However, there was method in the Mongols’ madness. Artisans and craftsmen, with 
their families, were often spared the Mongols’ fury and, separated from their less 
fortunate fellow citizens, they were often forcibly exported east to practice their 
crafts in other parts of the empire. In Khwarazm (Khiva) in 1221, it is said that each 
of the 50,000 Mongol troops was assigned twenty-four Muslims to slaughter before 
being able to loot and pillage. It is also reported that Chinggis Khan personally 
implored the famed Suﬁ  master and founder of the Kubrawiya Suﬁ  order, Najm al-
Din Kubra, to accept safe passage out of the condemned city. The saint refused but 
allowed his disciples to accept. Even at this early stage, the “barbarian” Tatars dem-
onstrated a respect for and knowledge of scholars and learning. 
 There is a tradition prevalent among some Suﬁ  sects that rather than suffering 
his fate silently in the rubble of Bukhara, it was Najm al-Din Kubra who actually 
unleashed the Mongols upon the iniquitous Khwarazmshah. Other similar tradi-
tions have a dervish leading the Mongol forces into Khwarazm, the holy man and 
spiritual guide, al-Khidr, assuming that role, and the Mongols enjoying divine pro-
tection and guidance as they rode out of the east. 12  
 Though Chinggis died in 1227, his empire, unlike other steppe empires, sur-
vived through his progeny, who succeeded in maintaining and extending his power 
and territories. Chinggis Khan rode out from the steppe as a nomadic ruler intent 
on rapine, pillage, and booty. Combining these traditional steppe practices with 
dexterous political and military skills, he proved unstoppable. The devastation he 
inﬂ icted differed only in its scale from the raids of other nomadic rulers before him. 
Cities were razed, walls consistently demolished, the  qanat system of underground 
irrigation was both damaged physically and, perhaps more seriously, allowed to fall 
into disrepair through neglect. Though superlatives have been liberally applied to 
Chinggis Khan and his triumphant hordes, it is worth pausing to consider a recent 
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detailed study of the available sources that aims to uncover the reality beneath the 
adjectives and adverbs. Charles Melville’s lecture at the Indo-Mongolian Society, 
New York University, on the impact of the invasion concludes that the devastation 
and brutality of the Mongol invasion has been much overstated and that this exag-
geration was welcomed by the Mongols themselves, who enjoyed and beneﬁ ted 
from their fearsome reputation. It should also be borne in mind that just as the 
Muslim former subjects of the Qara Khitai welcomed Noyan Jebe and the initial 
Mongol advance, so too did many of the merchants, local governors, and disgrun-
tled commanders under the nominal rule of the Khwarazmshah welcome the 
embracing power from the east that would open up frontiers long locked in danger 
and warfare. Though devastating, much of the devastation occurred in the mind 
rather than on the ground. 
 However, Chinggis was astute enough to realize that continued pillage and kill-
ing in order to satisfy the material needs of his hordes would be counterproductive 
and would eventually succeed only in destroying the source of their wealth. He 
knew that the “sown” must be fed rather than just fed off. He had wreaked horror 
and destruction on an unprecedented scale and had achieved legendary status 
within his own lifetime. As long as he could deliver the riches to quiet his voracious 
followers, he and his progeny would reign unchallenged. 
 Chinggis was a man of vision. The blood and destruction, the plunder and the 
terror had been in the tradition of the age-old conﬂ ict between the steppe and the 
sown. Often apparent adversaries, the steppe and the sown had in fact a symbiotic 
relationship. Though the steppe seemed to have achieved an overwhelming victory, 
Chinggis knew that its future depended on the sown. The mean tents of his child-
hood had been transformed into the lavish pavilions of his kinghood. The ragged 
camps of old had been replaced by mobile cities of wealth, splendor, and sophistica-
tion. The infamy he now enjoyed served as his security. 
 In fact, the death tolls recorded and the descriptions of the desolation his armies 
had caused were beyond credibility. The province of Herat, let alone the city, could 
not have sustained a population of two million, and the logistics involved in actu-
ally murdering this number of people within a matter of days are inconceivable. 
Who would have maintained order as the victims awaited their turn for execution? 
How would knives and swords been kept sharp and clean for such an arduous task? 
Where would the mounting piles of bodies and their possessions been stored? 
Would the executioners have worked shifts and continued through the night? Would 
food and drink have been served to executioners and victims as the job proceeded? 
Chroniclers such as Ibn al-Athir, not an eyewitness himself, did much to perpetuate 
the mythology of the Mongol rule of terror.
 A single one of them [Mongol] would enter a village or quarter wherein were many 
people, and would continue to slay them one after another, none daring to stretch 
forth his hand against this horseman. And I have heard that one of them took a man 
captive, but had not with him any weapon wherewith to kill him; and he said to his 
prisoner, ‘Lay your head on the ground and do not move’; and he did so, and the 
Tatar went and fetched his sword and slew him therewith. 13  
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 These apocryphal tales and the exaggerated accounts of massacres and mayhem 
were believed as literal truth. This vision of the Tatars as a visitation from hell was 
readily accepted by religious zealots, both Christian and Muslim, who were able to 
shift responsibility for the carnage onto the sins and laxity of their faithful 
followers. 
 Before his death, Chinggis Khan had appointed his second son Ögödei as his 
successor and divided his empire among the other progeny. To Jochi (d. 1226), who 
died before his father, went the lands of the west; to Chagatai (d. 1242) the lands of 
what is today eastern Turkistan, including western China; Ögödei (d. 1241) received 
lands to the east of this encompassing the Altai and Tarbagatai mountains as far as 
Lake Baikal. The youngest son Tolui (d. 1232), as tradition dictated, was granted the 
ancestral homelands in Mongolia. By 1241, Batu, Chinggis’s grandson, had overrun 
the principalities of Russia, subdued Eastern Europe, and reached the coastline of 
Croatia. The year 1256 saw the demise of the Assassins of Iran; 1258 witnessed the fall 
of Baghdad and the caliph of Sunni Islam, and another grandson, Hülegü, ﬁ rmly 
established in Western Asia. Qubilai Khan was able to proclaim himself not only 
Great Khan but also, in 1279, the emperor of a united China. But the seeds of con-
tention had also grown and spread their tentacles to the far reaches of the empire. 
 On Chinggis Khan’s decree, Batu, son of the ﬁ rstborn Jochi, had been granted 
all those lands to the west “trod by Tatar hoof.” This included Russia, Eastern Europe, 
and the Caucasus, but most controversially northern Iran, the rich pastures of 
Azerbaijan, and all those other lands that had been trampled under the thunderous 
hooves of the  noyan s Jebe and Sübedei during their infamous reconnaissance trip of 
1222. In 1251, after a bloody and contentious election, Möngke Khan, oldest of the 
sons of Tolui, assumed the leadership of the Mongol Empire, and the splits breaking 
the unity of the empire became open. Möngke sent one brother, Qubilai, to rule in 
the East and another brother, Hülegü, to rule in the west. However, the lands that 
Hülegü traveled west to claim, the lands from the banks of the Oxus to the banks of 
the Nile, included those areas of northern Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus 
claimed by the sons of Jochi. Following the death of the universally respected Batu 
Khan in 1255 and Hülegü’s assumption of power in Maragheh circa 1258, Berke 
Khan, Batu’s brother and the new commander of the Golden Horde, declared war 
on his cousin Hülegü. This was not only a war over territory but also a war for the 
soul of the Mongol empire. The new rulers of Iran and China, the Toluids Hülegü 
and Qubilai, represented the new face of the Mongol conquerors. They were no 
longer the traditional steppe warriors of old. Many of the traditionally minded 
Mongols more aware of their nomadic roots did not like what they saw. It was this 
dichotomy that rent the Mongol Empire apart after the death of Möngke in 1259 
and lay at the heart of the bitterly and bloodily contested civil war that followed, 
leaving Qubilai Great Khan of a fragmented empire. 
 War and conquest continued, but the nature of the conquerors and rulers had 
changed. Qubilai Qa’an (Qa’an is equivalent to “khan of khans” or Great Khan) is 
quoted in contemporary Chinese sources as declaring that “having seized the body, 
hold the soul, if you hold the soul, where could the body go?” to explain his support 
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and cultivation of Tibetan Buddhism. 14  The new generation of Mongols were 
essentially settled nomads, living in semipermanent urban camps, educated, 
sophisticated, and appreciative of life’s ﬁ neries and luxuries. Qubilai Qa’an has 
been described as “the greatest cosmopolitan ruler that has ever been known in 
history.” 15  His brother Hülegü and the Ilkhans in Iran received other plaudits for 
their rule and their justice, far-sightedness, and statesmanship. Both Toluid rulers 
represented the new face of the Mongols, and it was their economic, cultural, and 
political alliance that transformed both Iran and China and the lands under their 
sway. 
 Once in power, the Mongol princes avowedly sought to rule their subjects with 
justice and tolerance and for the prosperity of all. They ruled by the standards of 
the time, and contemporaries differentiate between the rude “barbarian” nomads 
of the past and their present masters ensconced in their fabulous imperial courts. 
 The ragged remains of the Khwarazmshah’s army, led by the bandit king Jalal 
al-Din Mingburnu, inspired far more fear and loathing than did the disciplined 
Mongol troops. Though the Iranian statesman and historian Ata Malik Ala al-Din 
Juwayni portrayed Jalal al-Din Khwarazmshah as a hero bravely continuing the 
battle for “Persian independence” against impossible odds, the reality, as Juwayni 
well knew, was that the adventurer was battling solely for his own survival and his 
own selﬁ sh ends. This iconic Persian hero, “leaping like a stag” 16  across the moun-
tains and deserts of Iran, whose daring won the admiration of Chinggis Khan him-
self, met his end in the lonely mountains of Kurdistan in 1231, robbed and murdered 
by bandits who probably never knew who their victim was. Sightings of Jalal al-Din 
continued to be reported, and his questionable departure endowed him with an 
almost mystical and mythical status. 
 The Mongols had never targeted speciﬁ c groups for persecution on religious, 
nationalistic, or ethnic grounds. When Baghdad was attacked, it was with the advice 
of Muslim advisers such as Nasir al-Din Tusi, and many of the supporting armies 
were led by Muslim rulers ﬁ ghting under the banner of Islam. Co-option was the 
desired result of conquest or the threat of attack. Top administrators in all parts of 
the empire were Mongol, Chinese, Persian, Uyghur, Armenian, European, or Turkish. 
Loyalty and ability were prized above ethnicity or religion. A center of learning was 
established around 1260 in Iran’s ﬁ rst Mongol capital, Maragheh. It attracted schol-
ars from around the world who ﬂ ocked, in particular, to see the observatory built 
for the court favorite, Tusi. The Syriac cleric, historian, philosopher, and writer Bar 
Hebraeus (d. 1286) used the libraries, stocked from the ruins of Baghdad, Alamut, 
and other conquered cultural centers, to research his own acclaimed studies and his 
renowned history. The Nation of Archers had changed its priorities. 
 But the incorporation of the Iranian heartlands into the Mongol Empire proper 
was not a one-sided decision. The Persian notables of the various Iranian city-states 
had not been unaware of events and developments in the east. Westerners were not 
infrequent visitors to the increasingly opulent and cosmopolitan Mongol court. 
The accession of Möngke Khan witnessed an acceleration of trafﬁ c to Qaraqorum 
of supplicants eager to assure their place in the new world order. Among those eager 
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supplicants was an embassy from Qazvin, a city with strong links with the Mongol 
elite, that sought more than the usual requests for recognition, allegiance, and aid. 
The notables of Qazvin, and in particular the Iftikhar family, had long and close ties 
with the Mongol nobility, including a position as tutor to the young Toluid  princes. 17  
This embassy from Qazvin, led by their chief qadi and including merchants, wished 
to capitalize on those links and ﬁ nally “bring Iran in from the cold” and have their 
land incorporated fully into the empire, with a royal prince appointed to replace the 
corrupt and heavy-handed military governor, Baiju Noyan. The elite of Qazvin 
would have been fully aware of the success and prosperity of fellow Muslims and 
Persian communities elsewhere in the empire. Persians and Muslims were well rep-
resented in the  keshig (imperial or Praetorian guard). The omnipresent  bitikchi s 
(administrative ofﬁ cials) were generally recruited from non-Mongols, and Muslims 
swelled their ranks. 18  
 The likes of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Umar al-Bukhari, long before his eleva-
tion to governor of Dali (in modern-day Yunnan, China), would have been an 
inspiration for those left in the anarchy of the Iranian Plateau. His grandfather, 
along with his troops, had surrendered to the Mongols after the defeat of the 
Khwarazmshah, and his son had entered the Mongols’ army of bureaucrats. The 
infant Sayyid Ajall was a “child of the empire” and grew up in the  keshig before 
receiving postings around the Mongols’ expanding territory. A Muslim, Sayyid 
Ajall’s loyalty was to the state that nurtured him, gave him aspirations, and met 
those aspirations. He would have identiﬁ ed with the elite of that multiethnic and 
multicultural state. He was a Muslim and a “Persian” and a member of the ruling 
elite of the Mongol superstate. He was absorbed into the Mongol polity around 
1220, and now the notables of Qazvin saw that their time had come and that with 
the raising of Möngke Khan, their former young charge, to Great Khan they should 
act now and seek a reassessment of their status vis-à-vis Qaraqorum. That a con-
spiracy was afoot when the delegation traveled eastward is made plain by later 
developments. 
 Ata Malik Juwayni recognized God’s secret intent in unleashing the Mongols 
onto the Islamic world not only in the annihilation of the Isma‘ilis but in the rise 
of Möngke Khan and the placing of the “keys to the lands of the world” in the 
“hands of the [Mongols’] power” ( dar dast-i qodrat ). 19  Juwayni, having traveled 
east himself, was fully aware that Persians and Muslims were among those who 
exercised the Mongols’ power. The “conspiracy” envisaged the appointment of a 
royal prince who would establish a seat in the West and who could be co-opted 
and integrated into the political and cultural elite of Iran. That this was the 
unspoken agenda and long-term plan is made plain by the appearance of Qadi 
Badawi’s “pocket history,” the  Niżām al-tavārīkh , which hardly a decade after 
Hülegü Khan’s establishment of his seat of government in Maragheh was already 
portraying the Ilkhanate as a legitimate and entrenched Iranian dynasty. 20  The 
secondary aim of conversion of the Mongol leadership to Islam would not be 
realized for more than another four decades, but their gradual conversion to 
Persian culture was evident in the  immersion of the Mongol elite grouped 
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around the Ilkhan in the cultural landscape, as exempliﬁ ed by the Mongol  noyan 
Suqunjaq (Suqunchaq). 21  
 Juwayni had begun his history of the Mongols at the urging of his companions 
at Möngke’s court, and his imagery drew from deep within Iran’s rich mythological 
and cultural heritage to adorn and dress his Mongol heroes. Juwayni had begun a 
process that would cumulate in the magniﬁ cent creation of the Mongol  Shahnameh 
(an illustrated manuscript often identiﬁ ed by the name of a former owner, Georges 
Demotte). Möngke’s court receptions invoke the verses of Ferdowsi, while Sorqotani 
Beki, mother of the ruling Toluid brothers, Hülegü Khan, and the Mongol army are 
adorned in the words and images of Iran’s deﬁ ning epic, the  Shahnameh . Juwayni 
was writing an unfolding history, and he must have been fully aware of the weight 
his words might bear and the echo his images would chime. He was painting the 
Mongols not so much as they wished to be seen but more as he and the Persian elite 
might wish them to become. 
 Hülegü’s assault on the Isma‘ilis’ stronghold was widely welcomed, and there 
was little sign of opposition to the devastating attack on Baghdad, in which the 
Iranian local leaders were well represented. The Iranians had assessed the potential 
and outcome of the establishment of a Mongol regime and they knew that they had 
little to lose and possibly a great deal to gain. The caliph had failed on all counts. He 
had neither uniﬁ ed the Muslim world nor confronted its enemies in the form of the 
Isma‘ilis and the Khwarazmian brigands. Their new ruler, Hülegü, had sought legit-
imacy from his subjects and had received a fatwa from the ‘ alim Ibn Tavus stating 
that a just inﬁ del ruler was preferable to an unjust Muslim sovereign [ibn Tabatana, 
p. 14; ibn Taqtaqi, pp. 18–19]. 22  If the Persian notables had dared to envisage a part-
nership, Hülegü did not douse their optimism. 
 Hülegü was quickly adopted by the notables of Iran as a “legitimate” sovereign 
in that his position as king was fully accepted and recognized, and his new subjects 
were quick to realize that they were to enjoy a large degree of autonomy and joint 
rule. There was not the passive resistance of the intellectuals said to have occurred 
in Yuan China, the other half of the Toluid state, though the extent of this resistance 
has been greatly overstated [see Jay]. 23  Even the ulema retained their positions of 
inﬂ uence and prestige, and those high ofﬁ cials who took part in the Mongol admin-
istration never suffered rebuke or criticism from their compatriots. In the case of 
the Parvana of Rum, his own self-doubts were allayed and put to rest by the 
renowned Suﬁ  poet and former leading member of the ulema, Jalal al-Din Rumi 
[ Fiyeh māﬁ yeh , p. 23; tr. p.11]. 24  Hülegü himself, now armed with a fatwa to legiti-
mize his rule, encouraged those with ability, Muslim or otherwise, to seek the high-
est posts. 
 When Hülegü arrived in Iran, he did so at the request of a delegation sent to the 
Great Khan Möngke, his brother, in the Mongol capital Qaraqorum. The delegation 
was led by a religious leader, the Qadi of Qazvin, who in 1252 requested the Great 
Khan Möngke to replace the military governor of Iran, the  noyan Baiju, with a royal 
prince, “to build a bridge” so that Iran might enjoy the rule of justice and law  present 
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 O illustrious and magnanimous Qa’an we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, 
or brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over that river, for 
where there is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over the river Amu 
Darya [Oxus] ﬁ nds the Qa’an’s justice, and on this side of the river there is justice 
and a path. On that side of the river, the world is evil, and some people become 
prosperous through injustice. 25 [Mustawﬁ ,  Zafarnāmeh , vol.II, p.5] 
 Hülegü’s arrival and welcome in Iran stands in sharp contrast to the arrival of the 
Mongol envoys thirty years before. For Iran, Hülegü represented the return of a 
king. Hülegü’s establishment of a state in Iran toward the end of the 1250s marked 
an end to an enduring period of anarchy that had prevailed in the region since the 
early twelfth century. As he began his leisurely journey westward, he was waylaid by 
well-wishers and greeted by dignitaries and rulers from throughout the west.
 There came willingly to his service a large number of the princes and generals. 
People came from every house and from by roads to praise him. At every halting 
place where they stopped, they received praise from those along the way. 26 
 [Mustawﬁ ,  Zafarnāmeh , vol.II, p.17] 
 Even the Isma‘ili Khurshah sent representatives to earn his goodwill and pledge 
allegiance. Rulers such as Shams al-Din Kart had already proved their loyalty on the 
battleﬁ eld, and local kings and royals such as those from Cilician Armenia, Kerman, 
Yazd, Shiraz, and other Iranian, Caucasian, and Anatolian provinces had previously 
established their allegiance and “devotion” to the Mongols. Hülegü had little to fear 
from the country he was entering, and the opposition he expected, namely from the 
Isma‘ilis, he was well prepared to greet. Even his later treatment of Khurshah was 
merciful, and it was not at Hülegü’s hand or command that the Nizari Imam met 
his fate. This was not a man seeking vengeance and destruction. Hülegü Khan came 
westward to further Mongol overall hegemony over the Islamic lands and to estab-
lish his own power base in Iran and Iraq. 
 The scale and extent of his support on the ground is recorded by a contempo-
rary, Qutḅ al-Dīn Shīrāzī, writing in 1283. The writer’s point is clear. Hulegu Khan 
operated with the support of the rulers of the whole country. The chronicle states 
that the Atabeg of Shiraz, the sultans of Rum, the kings of Khorasan, Sistan, 
Mazanderan, Kerman, Rustamdar, Shirwan, Gorjestan, Iraq, Azerbayjan, Arran, and 
Luristan and some other representatives all came. Others sent their brothers or rela-
tives and they all sent men, military supplies, provisions, and gifts and placed them-
selves at his service. 27  
 That Hülegü had higher ambitions than the destruction and oppressive subju-
gation of a sedentary society is made obvious by his treatment of those who fell 
under his power and judgment. He was aware that he could not blindly trust even 
his own relatives and that the “locals” had to be cultivated at all levels and in all 
institutions. The Isma‘ili governor of Quhistan, Naser al-Din, whose erudition was 
widely known, was quickly pardoned and honored despite his associations with the 
hated Isma‘ilis, as was the renowned Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, whose denunciation 
of his former Isma‘ili masters was instantly accepted. Nasir al-Din Tusi was almost 
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immediately installed in a place of honor and power in Hülegü’s court, and yet his 
only prowess was his remarkable intellectual dexterity and scholarly reputation. In 
fact, it had been Möngke Khan who had assured Tusi a warm reception. Aware of 
Tusi’s reputation as an astronomer/astrologer, he had requested that his brother 
entertain the eminent intellectual until such time as it would be convenient to send 
him eastward. Möngke wanted Tusi to build him an observatory in Qaraqorum, 
though the Great Khan died before Tusi had even thought of departing. Hülegü did 
not share his brother’s passion for the stars, but he was prepared to indulge his 
acclaimed guest, since Baghdad’s libraries to which Tusi had already laid claim were 
protected by a generous  waqf whose implications were already being calculated by 
Tusi. The Mamluk chronicler, Ibn Aybak al-Safadi (1296–1363), reported the chagrin 
of the Baghdad ulema, angered at what they saw as the theft not only of their books 
but of the considerable funds from which the library’s upkeep, salaries, and other 
expenses would be paid. After the fall of Baghdad, one of Tusi’s ﬁ rst tasks was the 
establishment of his seat of learning in Maragheh containing his famous library of 
400,000 books and hilltop observatory, a center for an international cast of academ-
ics, clerics, and scholars. Bar Hebraeus found sanctuary and peace in that haven of 
learning, and possibly chose the same site for a new church. Arguably, it is traces of 
this church that can still be seen today in Maragheh on the western face of a hill 
overlooking the city only thirty or forty meters beneath the observatory, the Rasad-
Khaneh, only the foundations of which remain visible today. 
 Though destruction and looting were permitted if not encouraged during the 
assault on Baghdad, the destruction was not as great as has been claimed. In fact, 
heavy ﬂ ooding in 1255 and 1256 coupled with the unremitting sectarian strife 
between the Shi‘a and Sunni had already wreaked widespread damage to the city. 
Many buildings, especially churches and Shi’i mosques and the home of the Shi‘i 
 alim , Ibn Tavus, were spared, suggesting that the ﬁ nal assault and looting spree was 
not as unbridled and barbaric as has been claimed. The thinker and Shi’i divine, Ibn 
Tavus, together with other clergy and scholars were all spared the massacres of 
Baghdad, and like the Caucasus’s leading Christian clerics and academics were soon 
co-opted into Hülegü’s circle of apparent admirers. This was not the sparing of pos-
sible magic makers or spiritual interlocutors by the superstitious, the ignorant, and 
the naive, but the deliberate policy of a ruler with aspirations beyond his origins, a 
conclusion alluded to in Rashid al-Din’s closing pages on Hülegü Khan. Though the 
vizier makes some disparaging remarks about Hülegü’s trust and belief in the deceits 
and trickery of the alchemists on whom the Ilkhan squandered his resources, Rashid 
al-Din readily acknowledges Hülegü’s keen interest in science and the disputations 
and discussions of philosophers and scholars and his generous allocation of pen-
sions and stipends to these learned “hangers-on.” 
 If in these early years of Mongol rule the countries and provinces enjoying 
Ilkhanid rule generally prospered and experienced a long-absent period of relative 
peace and security, the resurgence of patronage, the regeneration of an enriched 
spirituality, and the establishment of a cultural identity that has persisted until the 
present day were all fruits garnered as a result of that development. The period of 
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Ilkhanid rule is widely recognized as having been a period of great cultural creativ-
ity and even a golden age of artistic and spiritual expression, though the explana-
tions for this renaissance differ greatly. Often portrayed as symptomatic of the 
spiritual malaise of a desperate people overwhelmed by the horror and hopelessness 
wrought by the Mongol invasions, the popularity of and interest in Suﬁ sm, which 
was enjoying a resurgence during the Ilkhanid decades, had in fact begun well before 
the Mongols appeared in the west. No longer so restricted by a legalistic and ritual-
istic Sunni ulema, Suﬁ  lodges sprang up throughout Hülegü’s domains and enjoyed 
the patronage of the ruling elite and the following of the masses. With travel rela-
tively safe and unrestricted, wandering bands of  qalandar s (wandering, disreputable 
dervishes) became a familiar sight, while more traditionally minded Suﬁ   khanqah s 
(religious hospices) offered lodging to more conventional travelers. In urban cen-
ters and in the royal  diwan s, Suﬁ  masters of a more moderate bent than the antino-
mian  qalandar s or some of the patrons and organizers of the  khanqah s offered their 
services to the ruling circles, Mongol, Turk, and Tajik, and in return received often 
lavish patronage. 
 Mongol involvement in the cultural life of this new kingdom was expressed at 
different levels, from Hülegü’s commissioning of Nasir al-Din Tusi’s observatory at 
Maragheh and his support of philosophers and thinkers to the great Suqunjaq’s col-
laboration with Rashid al-Din in sponsorship of learning and the arts and local 
Mongol agents immersing themselves in the spiritual life of their provinces even 
when they perceived such contacts as a challenge to their own beliefs. This was the 
case with the Ilkhan Arghun’s tolerance of his boyhood friend’s desertion of the life 
of the  diwan for that of the Suﬁ . The mystic poet Ala al-Dawla al-Simnani (d. 1336) 
was born into a leading Persian family of court ofﬁ cials with close links to the ruling 
circles of Mongol Iran. The young Simnani had been expected to assume high ofﬁ ce 
in the Ilkhanid court, especially after his lifelong friend Prince Arghun became king. 
However, after a mystic vision in 1286, the young poet abandoned everything else in 
order to devote himself to his calling. 
 The Mongol ruling elite cannot be seen as a separate entity divorced from the 
land they ruled. Since they had ﬁ rst migrated across the Oxus, the  diwans of the 
Mongols had increasingly harbored within their folds the young, the inﬂ uential, 
and the powerful from among the “conquered” people. The sons and daughters of 
the local elites had been reared in, or with access to, these increasingly sumptuous 
 ordu s. The children of the progressively sophisticated Mongol nobles were reared 
alongside the progeny of their Persian, Turkish, Armenian, Khwarazmian, or 
Georgian administrators and commanders. 
 The nearly two generations and three long decades separating the initial 
Mongol invasion over the Oxus from the generally welcomed conquest of the hosts 
of Hülegü in the 1250s saw great changes in the nature of the conquerors and their 
retinue. The acculturation was gentle and the cultural borrowing mutual. The 
adoption of the trappings of majesty so dear to the Persians, with their ceremonial 
robes of gold and brocade, fell naturally onto the shoulders of Mongol tradition. 
The old guard was still there, but the face of the new regime was not the visage of 
0001262028.INDD   256 8/10/2011   1:25:17 PM
the mongols in iran 257
alien terror that had so troubled the world in the second decade of the century. If 
Chinggis Khan had been the punishment of God, his grandson Hülegü was “God’s 
secret intent revealed.” 28  
 The opening years of the Ilkhanid state saw, then, a widespread cultural blos-
soming of a knot of trends that had been slowly emerging from the early thirteenth 
century. The reasons for this renaissance are many, but it was the relative stability, 
the economic revival through trade, and a sudden reawakened conﬁ dence that sur-
faced after it became clear that the masters in Maragheh were there to stay, and it 
was this that provided the basis on which that trend would grow. The anarchy and 
disruption that grew and intensiﬁ ed after the irruption of the Mongols in the ﬁ rst 
quarter of the thirteenth century added to the already growing numbers of refugees 
heading westward. The Sultanate of Rum in Anatolia offered an early haven where 
the inﬂ ux of poets, Suﬁ s, and  qalandar s, along with merchants, exiled notables, and 
refugees, was welcomed, and many of these diverse people were soon assimilated 
into the multiethnic, pluralistic, and religiously and culturally tolerant sultanate. 
The Saljuq sultanate in Rum stood in contrast to the chaotic and anarchic lands to 
the east. 
 After Hülegü’s triumphant march across northern Iran to establish his capital 
in Maragheh in the 1250s, this situation changed. It was awareness of the change that 
Hülegü’s advent promised that prompted Sa‘di’s return to his beloved Shiraz, as the 
poet himself informs his readers in the preface to his  Gulistan . The remnants of the 
Khwarazmians had ﬂ ed into Syria, the Isma‘ilis had been conquered and dispersed, 
the caliphate had been neutralized, the Persian ministates, such as Kerman, Shiraz, 
and Yazd, had pledged allegiance to the new king, and once again the roads of Iran 
were made safe for business and travel. Quite suddenly, Azerbaijan became the 
western hub of a vast land empire and Tabriz the emporium of a transcontinental 
trading network. For those ﬁ rst two decades, the new Ilkhanid state was able to 
enjoy the fruits of strong central government, relative internal political stability, and 
unfettered trade and cultural links. 
 The demise of the caliphate freed a blossoming spirituality from previous 
constraints, and the new effectively secular authorities did not interfere with 
these emancipated schools. Sunni Islam was able to cast aside the chains of its 
Arab roots and assume its more global Turco-Persian identity. The bureaucrats 
of the Ilkhanid  diwan were Persians who had grown up in Mongol  ordu s, and 
their early companions and childhood friends had been Mongols as well as Turks, 
Armenians, Persians, Uyghurs, and Khwarazmians. They were a new generation, 
just as their Mongol overlords were a new generation at least one step removed 
from the harsh austerity and brutality of the steppe. If the unity and stability of 
the new regime began to unravel after Abaqa’s death and the political rivalries 
between princes and bureaucratic clans began to destroy what order and disci-
pline Hülegü and his son had succeeded in implementing, this should not detract 
from the accomplishments of the new order or obscure the aims and aspirations 
on which the new order was based. If there was a return to partial anarchy and 
confusion in the last two decades of the thirteenth century, it should not be 
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 forgotten that ﬁ rst three decades of the fourteenth century were to become a 
golden age for some. 29  
 It has long been assumed that it was the reign of Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) 
and his remarkable prime minister Rashid al-Din Hamadani (d. 1318) that marked 
the transformation of the Ilkhanate from a “barbarian” nomadic state into a com-
paratively stable “civilized” society. This traditional analysis is not only simplistic 
and clichéd, it is manifestly wrong. Ghazan Khan was responsible for making Islam 
the ofﬁ cial religion of the state, and he became a Muslim himself. His chief minister, 
Rashid al-Din, was also responsible for a number of wide-ranging and sweeping 
reforms in response to the political and economic chaos of the previous two decades. 
However, such changes, important though they undoubtedly were, cannot negate 
the achievements and popular rule of the ﬁ rst two Ilkhans, Hülegü and his son 
Abaqa (d. 1282). It was they who laid the foundations of the state that was to ﬂ ourish 
until 1335 and whose legacy is still evident today. 
 Since the principal source for information on the reign of the “reforming” 
Ilkhan, Ghazan Khan, is his chief minister, the proliﬁ c Rashid al-Din, whose remark-
able  Jāmi‘ al-Tawārīkh (“Collection of Histories”) describes not only the reforms 
themselves but the background behind their implementation, the question of bias, 
political maneuvering, and self-interest must be considered crucial to any interpre-
tations, conclusions, and claims made by this powerful minister. The lengthy chap-
ters detailing Ghazan’s years in power and his administrative reforms, in which this 
minister played such a critical role, form the core of Rashid al-Din’s voluminous 
work, and that his personal stamp is indelibly marked upon these pivotal pages is 
indisputable. His assessment of the Mongols’ legacy with which his master, the 
 Padeshah-i Islam , was faced with dealing is damning, though its vehemence is remi-
niscent of the polemic of the politician.
 When provinces and great cities were being subjugated [The Mongols] killed so 
many people throughout the length and breadth of the provinces that few were 
left, like Balkh, Shuburqan, Taliqan, Marv, Sarakhs, Herat, Turkestan, Ray, 
Hamadan, Qum, Isfahan, Maragheh, Ardabil, Barda‘a, Ganjah, Baghdad, Irbil, and 
most provinces attached to these cities. 30  
 This was known to be a blatant exaggeration of the reality of the invasions, only the 
ﬁ rst of which was predominantly destructive in nature. Such passages suggest that 
their writer was intent on the creation of an image for his patron through the use of 
rhetoric and that his presentation of the “facts” had an ulterior motive beyond his 
usual faithful recording of history. 
 That the Ilkhan Ghazan was a remarkable man and an exceptional ruler is 
widely averred, and his commitment to reform is not disputed. He was a patron of 
the arts and sciences, he was a linguist, he was according to Rashid al-Din and oth-
ers an accomplished artisan of various crafts, and his keen interest in the traditions 
and legacy of his ancestors was undimmed by his enthusiastic adoption of Islam. It 
was his passion for knowledge of the past and the present that led him to commis-
sion his chief minister to embark on the remarkable compilation of histories, the 
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 Jāmi‘ al-Tawārīkh , the ﬁ rst part of which ensured that the Mongols and their legacy 
and role in the history of the world would far outlive their corporeal presence. If he 
was physically rather unprepossessing and off-putting, this was amply compensated 
by his other well-attested gifts, succinctly expressed by the Armenian historian 
Hetoum:
 And marvellous it was that so little a body might have so great virtue; for among 
a thousand men could not be so slender a man, nor so evil made, nor a fouler 
man. He surmounted all others in prowess and virtue. 31  
 Ghazan’s stature and special position in history as the ruler who restored the rule of 
the true faith to the Islamic world has embellished all contemporary and subse-
quent accounts of his reign and must be considered as an important factor when 
assessing the extent and effectiveness of his reforms and the contrasts drawn between 
his years in power and those of his pagan predecessors. 
 That there was a need for dramatic reform is indisputable, but as Wassaf, a con-
temporary historian and state accountant, pointed out, the dire economic situation 
in the country was due in no small degree to the chronic instability that had pre-
dominated immediately prior to Ghazan’s succession and had emptied the 
treasuries:
 no money remained in the treasury because in that year (1295) in the course of 
eight months three rulers had succeeded to the throne and twice in the far 
corners of the empire there had been large military expeditions, inevitably 
demands for payments in advance and extraordinary levies were made and 
 mavashi had been taken at the rate of 20% in most of the tax districts, especially 
in Fars. 32 [ Tārīkh-i Wassāf p.326] 
 The reigns of Ahmad, Arghun, Gaykhatu, and Baydu between 1284 and 1295 saw the 
country lapse again into relative instability after the euphoria of Hülegü and his son 
Abaqa, who had brought both prosperity and security after so many years of chaos. 
There was the struggle for the throne, the scandalous depravity of Gaykhatu Khan, 
and the economic madness accompanying the introduction of paper currency, the 
 chao , in imitation of the successful system operating in Yuan China. There was the 
horror of the outbreak of anti-Jewish riots and pogroms following the fall of the 
very competent Jewish vizier Sa‘d al-Dawla and his replacement by Sadr al-Din 
Zanjani, whose imposition of the  chao paved the way for Ghazan Khan, who had 
refused to force it on the people of Khorasan, where he was governor. Rashid al-Din, 
an adept political maneuverer, maximized the propaganda potential of the eco-
nomic chaos prevailing in the country when Ghazan succeeded. 
 There was a battle for ascendancy between the traditional “uncooked” Mongol 
lords, whose contempt for their subjects accounted for their remorseless demands 
for crippling taxes and ultimately self-defeating ill-treatment of these same seden-
tary “dust-scratchers,” and the reformers around Ghazan, who saw the lands of 
Persia as their future and perceived their own prosperity as intimately coupled with 
that of their settled subjects. Ghazan tried to convince his fellow Mongols that their 
practice of continual merciless exploitation of the peasantry was self-destructive, 
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since those same peasants provided the sustenance without which the Mongol 
hordes could no longer survive. In an oft-quoted speech that may or may not repro-
duce Ghazan’s actual words, this reasoning is spelled out and provides the rationale 
behind Ghazan’s reforms.
 “I am not partial to the Tajiks. If it were in my interests to pillage them all, no one 
would be more able to do it than I, and we would pillage together; but if hence-
forth you ex- pect to requisition supplies and meals, I will reprimand you 
severely. Just think–if you use violence on the peasants and take their cattle and 
grain or let your horses graze in their ﬁ elds, what you will do next? When you 
beat or hurt their wives and children, just think how dear our own wives and 
children are to us. Their children are just like that to them; they too are human 
beings like us. 33  
 His closing remarks would doubtless have caused considerable unease, since they 
implied a rejection of the traditional belief in the nomad’s inherent superiority to 
the people of the sown and were reﬂ ective of his adoption of Islam, the religion of 
the subject people. 
 How heartfelt his conversion to Islam was will always raise questions, since the 
wars with his fellow Muslims to the south, the Mamluks, continued unabated, as did 
his search for an alliance against the Egyptians with the Christian powers of the 
West and Anatolia. However, Ghazan saw himself as the legitimate leader of the 
Islamic world, and for him the Mamluks, as the sons of slaves without royal blood, 
were beneath contempt and certainly not worthy of being treated either as equals or 
as rivals. 
 His much-vaunted suppression of the Buddhists and Christians has been 
overstated, and in many cases it was certainly not instigated by him. In addition, 
many of the attacks on Christians and other non-Muslims were either the work of 
opportunists or were simply acts of violence interpreted in retrospect with the 
brush of religion. His appropriation of the trappings of Islam would have been 
necessary to capture the unquestioning loyalty and support of the majority popu-
lation in order to carry out his reforms against the wishes of much of the Mongol 
old guard. 
 If Ghazan wished to cement over the divide between conquerors and conquered 
and end the estrangement existing between Mongol and Persian, conversion to 
Islam was a prerequisite. However, it is also true that increasing numbers of Mongols 
were converting to Islam, inﬂ uenced no doubt by the large number of Turks in their 
ranks who had already converted. Since many of his harsher strictures against non-
Muslims and un-Islamic practices were relaxed later in his reign, the sincerity of his 
Islamic fervor, adopted at the same time as he was making his play for the throne 
against the pagan rival Baydu, might have been in part tactical. The Islam that the 
Mongols embraced was not the austere faith of the Sunni clerics but more the folk 
Islam beloved of the Turkomans, which allowed the reverence and rise of such Suﬁ  
masters as Shaykh Saﬁ  al-Din of Ardabil (d. 1334). These charismatic Suﬁ  masters 
would have bridged the gap between the rabbinical gravity of the traditionalist 
 mullahs and the shamans of the steppe. The titles Ghazan adopted established him 
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as both a champion of Islam and a successor to the crown of the Iranian kings: “His 
Majesty the Padishah of Islam, the Sovereign of the Seven Climates of the World,” 
“His Majesty the Refuge of Caliphate the Great Khosrow of Iran the Successor of 
the Realm of the Kayanids.” 34  His adopted titles sought to forge a link with an ancient 
heritage and provide spiritual vindication. His reforms would be ﬁ nal proof of the 
advent of a new age and the birth of a dynasty of Mongol Iranians. 
 The reforms that Ghazan proposed were far-reaching and comprehensive. 
Taxation in general was to be regulated and the frequency and method of collection 
formalized. Landholdings and villages were to be registered and their taxability ofﬁ -
cially assessed. Disputes over landownership would be settled, and lapses of over 
thirty years would invalidate claims. The once-lauded  yam (postal/relay) system 
was to be overhauled in an effort to end the widespread abuse of this courier service, 
and the activities and privileges of the  ilchi s (ofﬁ cial envoys) would be severely 
curbed. The status, powers, and ﬁ nancing of qadis (Islamic judges) were to be for-
malized. In the bazaar, weights and measures would be standardized and the coin-
age reformed. To repair some of the damage caused by the years of economic 
disruption and population dispersal, incentives were to be proposed in order to 
attract cultivators back to land that had fallen permanently fallow or had been 
abandoned. To encourage population growth, it was proposed that the size of dow-
ries be restricted, thus facilitating divorce and the ending of unproductive mar-
riages. The vexing problem of the army was also to be confronted, and the traditional 
Saljuqid practice of the  iqta (taxation rights to speciﬁ c land) was to be reintroduced 
to pay a soldiery many of whom had been dangerously deprived of their established 
form of remuneration, namely plunder. Perhaps most signiﬁ cantly, Ghazan pro-
posed ending the practice of issuing drafts on land and produce, with capital retri-
bution for infractions. Taxes would henceforth be collected by centrally appointed 
ofﬁ cials in cash, not kind. 
 Rashid al-Din’s unique histories not only provide the details of all these pro-
posals for reform but contain copies of the actual  yarligh s (edicts) themselves. 
However, what all this proves is that Ghazan and his ministers were acutely aware 
of the sorry state that their lands were in and that the need for reform was crucial. 
It is doubtful that much could have been achieved in the few years that Ghazan was 
actually secure upon the throne before his untimely early death at the age of thirty-
two, though he undoubtedly set in motion a trend away from the overly predatory 
practices of earlier years. By establishing a symbiotic relationship between the 
army and the land through the issuance of  iqta s, Ghazan hoped to reduce the drain 
on the treasury and remove the soldiers’ excuse for pilfering the peasantry to com-
pensate for their lack of supplies. However, once the pressure was relaxed, old hab-
its would invariably resurface, and vigilance would have to be constant to avoid the 
excesses of the past. 
Mustawﬁ  Qazvini, as a  mustawfī or audit ofﬁ cial in the ﬁ nancial administration 
of the latter Ilkhanate, had credible access to ﬁ gures pertaining to the state’s income. 
He states that revenue rose from 17 million dinars at the start of Ghazan’s reign to 21 
million at the close, an increase of about 23 percent over the nine years. Such a  ﬁ gure 
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is of a modesty suggesting reality and certainly credibility. Mustawﬁ  further adds 
that
at the present time [ca. 1340] it probably does not amount to half this sum, for in 
most of the provinces [of Iran] usurpation of authority is rampant with this 
coming and going of armies, so that the people even do withhold their hands 
from sowing the ﬁ elds. 35 
 This suggests that any reforms that did take effect were of limited duration. That 
both Ghazan and particularly Rashid al-Din, who owned extensive tracts of land 
throughout the empire, had honorable intentions is attested to in most of the 
sources. Tabriz greatly beneﬁ ted from the attentions of the sultan and his minis-
ter, who both rebuilt and added to large areas of the city. Ghazan constructed 
Mahmudabad on the Caspian coast and gave orders for the rebuilding of Ray, 
according to Mustawﬁ  still devastated from the early irruption of the Mongols. 
Ujan, renamed Shahr-e Islam, was likewise rebuilt, and prospered as a founda-
tion for charitable bequests instituted by Ghazan Khan. Under the Mongols there 
was an increase in the number and size of private estates, and Iranian civil ofﬁ -
cials, not just the Mongol ruling class, were able to accumulate vast personal 
fortunes based on the acquisition of land. These landowners had a personal 
interest in maintaining this land, reclaiming any “dead land” and exploiting to 
the maximum its agricultural potential, especially because the land could be 
passed down through their heirs, assuming their rivals or the state did not have 
alternative designs on it. 
 That any positive effects of the reforms were of limited duration is suggested 
by the chronicler of the  Tarikh-i Ruyan writing in 1362, twenty-ﬁ ve years after the 
demise of the Ilkhanate. His rather nostalgic vision of an Ilkhan Golden Age 
perhaps says more about the anarchy and insecurity of his own time than the 
prosperity and tranquility of the eighty years of Mongol rule. He remarks in 
particular on the rule of Ghazan Khan, Öljeitü, and the last Ilkhan, Abu Sa‘id (d. 
1335), as having been tranquil and free from the aggression of intruders: “in that 
time of [those Ilkhan] Kings, Iran was tranquil and free from the aggression of 
intruders, especially in the days of the sultanate of Ghazan Khan, Öljeitü 
Khodabandeh, and Abu Sa‘id Bahadur Khan.” 36  It was an age he even compared 
to an earthly paradise, “admirable and luxuriantly cheerful like the Garden of 
Paradise, tranquil and secure like the sanctuary of the Ka’ba.” 37  This view is 
echoed ca. 1360 by a historian of the Jalayirid dynasty (which ruled over Iraq and 
western Iran in the late fourteenth century), Abu Bakr al-Qutbi al-Ahari, who 
saw the turn of the century during Ghazan’s reign as a time of peace and justice: 
“During that time the whole of Iran was graced by the justice of the King of 
Islam, who held back the oppressor’s hand from (harming) the oppressed.” 
Al-Ahari added that this prosperity continued under the rule of his brother, 
Öljeitü Khodabandeh—“The country (was) ﬂ ourishing and the army well 
organised”—but reached its apogee in the time of Abu Sa‘id: “The time of his 
government was the best period of the  domination of the Mongols.” 38  However, 
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such views taken in hindsight and from a period of great political instability and 
economic chaos must be judged accordingly. 
 If it was Ghazan Khan who drew the battle lines between the old guard and the 
emerging Mongol Iranians and Persian “Mongols,” there is little to indicate that vic-
tory went immediately to either side. Whereas to the north, in the lands dominated 
by the Golden Horde, there were signs, such as Turkish-inscribed coins, that the 
Mongolian language had been superseded by Turkish as early as 1280, in the lands 
of Persia and Azerbaijan manuscripts and coins continued to be issued in Mongolian 
script at least to the end of the fourteenth century. The subjects of the Golden Horde 
were in the main Turks and fellow steppe nomads, whereas a far greater cultural 
divide existed between the sedentary and urbanized Persians of the Ilkhanate and 
their Mongol rulers. Resistance to Ghazan’s reforms would have been all the stron-
ger because they could have been seen as an assault on the very fundaments of the 
Mongol nomadic state and the Yasas of the Great Khan, Chinggis. Whether the pro-
gram for reform was as serious and widespread as Rashid al-Din’s writing suggests 
is doubtful. Islamic Persia was a far greater threat to the Mongol identity and the 
continuity of their traditions than was the culture of the Qipchaq Turks of the 
Golden Horde. 
 The greatest source for our knowledge pertaining to the reforms of Ghazan 
Khan is the pages of the  Jāmi‘ al-Tawārīkh, whose author was the architect of those 
same reforms. The history details the legislation and justiﬁ cation for their imple-
mentation. That Rashid al-Din felt the need for the creation of such an impressive 
manifesto suggests that he expected very great resistance to his recommendations. 
The fact that no major schism actually developed, that Ghazan died of natural 
causes and was succeeded relatively peacefully by his brother, and that no true 
polarization had become manifest even on the death of Abu Sa‘id in 1335 suggests 
that for all the rhetoric and posturing, no real attempt was made during Ghazan’s 
lifetime or later to forcibly carry out these radical proposals. On an individual level, 
certain towns, villages, or regions may have seen improvements in the lot of the 
peasants and town dwellers. As has been mentioned, Ghazan is known for his build-
ing work, particularly in Tabriz, and his brother, Öljeitü, is assured a worthy place 
in history for his construction of a new capital, the city of Sultaniya, with his remark-
able tomb that has survived to the present time. Ghazan Khan’s attempts to reform 
the psyche of his army to give them a stake in the agricultural economy by the issu-
ance of  iqta s occurred late in his reign and would not have had time to have any 
dramatic effect. His minister claimed that the measures were popular and that the 
“eyes and hearts” of the new military owners were well satisﬁ ed, that they were 
desirous of taking up the practice of farming and owning their own estates. However, 
for many of the Mongol troops husbandry could never be a complete substitute for 
the more lucrative and enjoyable pastime of marauding, and despite the overwhelm-
ing victories of 1300, Ghazan Khan never substantiated his conquest of Syria, and 
the province continued to function as a sporting ground for his soldiery, hungering 
for blood and loot. That a program of radical reform was conceived and that there 
was some degree of implementation is attested to in various sources, but it is only 
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the reforms’ architect, Rashid al-Din, who has dwelled to any great extent on their 
importance. If there was an economic upswing during Ghazan’s reign, and to a 
lesser extent in the reigns of his successors, this would have been due to no small 
degree to strong and comparatively stable leadership. Ghazan’s conversion to Islam 
would have been generally popular and would have led to an increase in coopera-
tion from the subject people. How popular his  yarligh s further tying the peasants to 
the land were with the  ra‘iyyat (people) is difﬁ cult to judge, since the decree merely 
formalized a practice that had been a reality before. The lot of the peasantry has 
always been chronically miserable, and it is unlikely that their fortunes changed to 
any great degree even if their overlords did. 
 Ghazan Khan owed his reputation as the reforming Ilkhan to the pages of his 
court historian and self-propagandist Rashid al-Din, a proliﬁ c writer with overrid-
ing political, terrestrial, and ﬁ nancial ambitions. Without the heralding of the pro-
posed reforms by his minister, Ghazan Khan would have been better known for his 
conversion to Islam and the comparative stability and resultant modest prosperity 
of his reign. The real importance of his conversion to Islam, far surpassing any sup-
posed economic or social reforms, was the narrowing of the cultural chasm between 
the occupiers and the occupied. By declaring himself the  Padeshah-i Islam and 
adopting the title of the ancient kings of Persia, Ghazan was committing himself to 
his adopted country and its people and pledging them to a common future and 
shared destiny. It has been suggested that the reason he commissioned Rashid al-
Din to write his history of the Mongols is that he realized that the future would see 
the Mongols’ ascendancy dissolved in the destiny of the majority and that he wished 
to assure their memory a worthy place in the annals of the future. His reforms were 
a vision probably formulated by his chief minister, but one that had little opportu-
nity or real hope of ever becoming a reality. 
 The Ilkhans did not decline and fade away into degeneracy and decadence, nor 
did they suffer military defeat or internal rebellion. They simply disappeared at the 
height of their power and prestige when Abu Sa‘id died and left no heirs to take his 
throne. In the ensuing scramble for power, the Ilkhanate empire split into various 
warring factions that within two generations were swept away by the destructive 
forces of Timur (Tamerlane, d. 1405). 
 During Abu Sa‘id’s reign, the confrontation between the old guard of Mongol 
amirs who still hankered after the traditions of the steppe and the reformers who 
had integrated fully with their adopted country came to a head, and a showdown 
between Abu Sa‘id’s chief minister, the Mongol  noyan Chopan, who was effectively 
the ruler of the country, and the rebellious lords resulted in the strengthening of the 
young king’s position. He forced a confrontation with Chopan, regarded by Abu 
Sa‘id and other notables as far too powerful. Abu Sa‘id had alienated the devout 
Muslim Chopan by insisting on the hand of his daughter, Baghdad Khatun, who 
unfortunately was already married to the aptly named Hasan-i Bozorg (“Big 
Hasan”). Abu Sa‘id invoked the Mongol  yasa that gave the ruler the right to claim 
the hand of any woman he wished, regardless of her marital status. He further 
antagonized his chief minister by arresting and then executing his eldest son, and 
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predictably the resulting ill-feeling gave way to charges of sedition and eventually 
confrontation. At the conclusion of this affair, Abu Sa‘id’s position seemed unassail-
able, and the country basked in the security, prosperity, and stability that the end of 
this period of strife had created. The king had even chosen a new young wife, 
Delshad, a niece of Baghdad Khatun. It was this last act that proved his undoing; 
Baghdad Khatun, in a ﬁ t of jealousy mixed with hatred of the man who had 
destroyed her marriage and murdered her father and brother, allegedly conspired 
with her ex-husband, Big Hasan (who later founded the Jalayirid dynasty, men-
tioned above), and together they poisoned Abu Sa‘id. Baghdad Khatun was executed 
by Abu Sa‘id’s successor (chosen by Rashid al-Din’s son, the vizier Ghiyath al-Din), 
Arpa Khan, who obviously chose to believe the accusation. 
 Arpa Khan (d. 1336), a claimant to the Ilkhanid throne through the youngest 
son of Tolui, Ariq Buqa, was an able army commander respected for his honesty, 
adherence to the law, and belief in traditional values. Arpa Khan was Abu Sa‘id’s 
designated heir, and he had agreed to three binding conditions set before him by 
the vizier, Ghiyath al-Din, namely, that ﬁ rst “he would not turn from truth, care, 
and justice for his people” and would not indulge in depravity or licentious 
behavior; secondly, that he would treat all subjects, whether Mongol or Persian, 
military or civilian, equally; thirdly, that he would show full respect for the sharia 
law, a condition thought necessary since he was not believed to be Muslim; and 
fourthly, that he allow the minister, Ghiyath al-Din, to retire. However, from the 
beginning, with his execution of Baghdad Khatun, Arpa Khan made enemies, 
and within two years he and the minister had been executed and the country dis-
solved into internecine strife. 
 In China, the Yuan dynasty was in decline after its golden years under Qubilai 
and his immediate successors. Bolad Agha, a leading Mongol administrator, states-
man, and thinker, had traveled to Iran as the personal envoy of the Great Khan 
Qubilai and had forged a close working and personal relationship with Rashid al-
Din. The Persian vizier had established his Rab-i Rashidi in Tabriz, which worked in 
tandem with the cultural institution in Khanbaliq, the Hanlin academy. Both insti-
tutions promoted culture and learning and encouraged in particular the writing of 
history. Rashid al-Din could not have completed his magisterial  Jāmi‘ al-Tawārīkh 
without the close assistance of Bolad Agha, who revealed to him the secrets of the 
Mongol libraries and histories. The intimacy existing between these two Toluid 
states was reﬂ ected in the vibrancy and vigor of their courts. The Mongols as cul-
tural and economic brokers rather than enablers encouraged trade and cultural 
exchange at all levels. Persians could be found throughout the Yuan administration. 
This was not because the Mongols did not trust their Chinese subjects, as has been 
suggested, but because Persian-speaking bureaucrats and merchants from Iran and 
Transoxiana were often linguists conversant in Turkish, Chinese, Mongolian, Arabic, 
Persian, and Uyghur. In fact, both states had become melting pots for artisans and 
workers from right across the vast Mongol empire. Just as Hülegü was responsible 
for the construction of Nasir al-Din Tusi’s observatory in Maragheh, so Qubilai 
authorized the construction of the observatory, overseen by a certain Jamal al-Din, 
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that still stands today in the center of Beijing. Qubilai commissioned Ikhtiyar al-
Din, another Muslim from the western Islamic lands, to assist in the design of his 
new capital, Dadu (Khanbaliq/Beijing). Astronomy, astrology, medicine, mapmak-
ing, printing, agronomy, agriculture, historiography, cuisine, and geography were 
all branches of learning actively encouraged and pursued by the Mongol courts. 
Persian communities were dominant in some important Chinese cities, especially 
the eastern ports such as Hangzhou, Zayton (Quanzhou), and Guangzhou. Rashid 
al-Din records that Baha al-Din Qunduzi was governor of Zayton while Shihab 
 al-Din Qunduzi was the  chingsang (government representative) of Hangzhou. The 
full extent of this intimate relationship between Mongol China and Iran is only 
recently being rediscovered, and it heralds a major new direction for future research. 
 In Hangzhou, the mosque, rebuilt in 1281 by the Persian Ala al-Din, stands to 
this day, and the tombstones secured in the mosque’s outhouse attest to the Persian 
community’s illustrious past. Discovered around 1920, during excavations to build 
the road that now encircles Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, a great number of tomb-
stones still lay buried on the site of the old royal Jujing Gardens. The lakeside royal 
gardens of the Song emperors adorning the shore and hills outside the Qingbo Gate 
had fallen into disrepair, and then sometime after 1276, when the city fell to the 
Mongol armies, and before 1291, when they are mentioned by the chronicler Zhou 
Mi, the gardens were given over to the Muslim community to serve as a cemetery, 
this in itself indicative of the prestige in which the mainly Persian Muslim commu-
nity was held at that time. Only twenty-one or so tombstones remain today, almost 
all held in the Phoenix Mosque, and their inscriptions attest to the status of the 
Persian community in the city under the Yuan when Hangzhou, though no longer 
the capital, retained its power and inﬂ uence, particularly as a cultural center. Military 
ﬁ gures such as the Amir Badr al-Din and the Amir Bakhtiar, important ofﬁ cials like 
Khwaja Mohammad bin Arslan al-Khanbaliqi, religious  alim s such as Taj al-Din 
Yahya ibn Burhan al-Din, and merchant  khwaja s such as “the pride of the mer-
chants, famous in the cities, patron of the learned,” Shams al-Din al-Isfahani and 
“pride of the merchants . . . famous in the cities . . . familiar among the princes of the 
regions of the coasts” Mahmud ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Simnani are just 
some of those whose tombstones, recording their deaths in the early fourteenth 
century, are only now being closely examined. Most of these ﬁ gures are honored as 
martyrs, a term signifying that they died far from home. Hangzhou, or Khansa’i as 
it was known in Persian, received oceangoing vessels, often in collaboration with the 
nearby port city of Ningbo, but was also a river port connected to the canal and 
river network of inland China. Many of its Persian citizens, like the mosque’s bene-
factor, Ala al-Din, would have arrived overland rather than by sea or, like another 
famous inhabitant of the Jujing cemetery, Sharaf al-Din (1256–1323), migrated to 
Hangzhou through promotion, having entered Chinggisid service through his 
father, one of those artisans moved from the “Western Regions” early in the Mongol 
conquests. Though written in Persian, the calligraphy was already showing early 
traces of what would become a very distinctive style, and the ﬂ oral border designs 
were reﬂ ective of the blue and white glaze porcelain for which the Yuan period 
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became so justly famous. Local chroniclers like the stubbornly nationalist Zhou Mi 
(1232–1308) accepted the Persians as part of their community, though their descrip-
tions often ignored their Persian and Muslim identities and instead emphasized 
their excellent Confucian traits and practices. Though examples of anti-Persian and 
anti-Muslim sentiments can be cited, such as in the writings of Tao Zongyi (b. 1316), 
the fact that a nationalist of Zhou Mi’s stature could write without malice about 
these foreigners at the heart of his community and accept them into his very elite 
circle of art collectors says much for what these Persian emigrants achieved so far 
from their homelands. 
 Most of what is now known of the Mongols comes from non-Mongol sources, 
among them Persian, Arabic, Armenian, European, and Chinese observers and 
commentators. While recognizing their might and military majesty, these sources 
often betray a degree of anti-Mongol bias. Even in the writings of their most loyal 
servants, such as the Persian and Muslim Juwayni (d. 1282), there is sometimes a 
sense of disdain and condescension for these arrivistes. In many ways, the Mongols 
have become a victim of their own propaganda and success. The horrors they 
perpetrated have become the crown on the head that they managed to raise so 
high. Their impact was of such might that their achievements have sometimes 
been submerged in that initial sea of blood. However, the legacy of the Mongol 
decades should not be underestimated, and just as the uniﬁ cation of China and 
the establishment of Beijing as the Chinese capital are constant reminders of the 
Yuan dynasty, so too in many ways was the kingdom of Hülegü the precursor of 
the modern state of Iran. In China, the arrival of the Ming resulted in an exodus 
of many Mongol tribes back to the north. In Iran, no such exodus ever occurred; 
the Mongols arrived en masse in 1255 by invitation, and they formed a joint 
administration with the Persian nobility. Integration was the aim of the Persians 
and the desire of most of the Mongol elite. The Ilkhanate was a testament to that 
union, and the cultural synthesis achieved has formed the basis of the emerging 
Iranian identity. Links to Chinggis Khan continued to be the source of legitimacy 
for subsequent Muslim dynasties ruling a polity recognizably Iranian until the 
sixteenth century, when Shah Isma‘il Safavi arose triumphant, claiming that his 
descent from the revered Shi‘i Imams gave him the right and the legitimacy to 
rule Iran. 
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